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Abstract
Undeniable signatures are the digital signatures that
should be verified with the help of the signer. A signer may
disavow a genuine document, if the signature is only verifi-
able with the aid of the signer under the condition that the
signer is not honest. Undeniable signatures solve this prob-
lem by adding a new feature called the disavowal protocol
in addition to the normal components of signature and ver-
ification. Disavowal protocol is able to prevent a dishonest
signer from disavowing a valid signature. In some situa-
tions, an undeniable signature should be converted into a
normal digital signature in order that the signature can be
universally verified. Blind signatures the digital signatures
that help a user to get a signature on a message without
revealing the content of the message to a signer. For the
blind signatures, if the signer is able to make an agreement
with the user, then the underlying signer may include some
common information that is known to the user, then such
signatures are partially blind signatures.
Convertible undeniable partially blind signatures are of
the features of undeniable signatures, blind signatures, con-
vertible undeniable signatures, and partially blind signa-
tures. Recently, a convertible undeniable partially blind sig-
nature scheme was presented. In this paper, we first analyze
a security flaw of the convertible undeniable partially blind
signature scheme. To address the security flaw, we present
an improvement on the disavowal protocol. The improved
scheme can prevent the signer from either proving that a
given valid signature as invalid, or cheating the verifier.
Keywords: Partially blind signature; Undeniable signa-
ture; Blind signature; Security protocol; Convertible unde-
niable signature.
1. Introduction
Undeniable signatures were first introduced in 1989 [1].
One of the primary features of undeniable signature is that
a signature can only be verified with the help of the signer.
This protects the signer against the possibility that docu-
ments signed by herself are duplicated and distributed with-
out her approval. However, if a signature is only verifiable
with the aid of the signer, a dishonest signer may disavow a
genuine document. Undeniable signatures solve this prob-
lem by adding a new component called the disavowal pro-
tocol in addition to the normal components of signature and
verification. Disavowal protocol can prevent a dishonest
signer from disavowing a valid signature. Therefore, un-
deniable signatures [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] can be applied to this
scenario: a software company is selling a useful software.
To ensure that their software is virus-free, they embed an
undeniable signature into each copy of the software. How-
ever, they hope that only legitimate buyers of the software
are able to verify the signature. At the same time, if copies
of the software are found to contain a virus, the software
company should not be able to disavow a valid signature in
the copies of the software.
The notion of designated verifier proofs was integrated
into the design of undeniable signatures [8, 9, 10]. For ex-
ample, a voting center can give a voter a proof that his vote
was actually counted without giving him the opportunity
to convince someone else of his vote. The use of desig-
nated verifier proof can provide non-interactive and non-
transferable confirmation and disavowal protocols for un-
deniable signatures. This is because the verifier can use his
private key to generate a valid proof, but he cannot convince
other parties that a signer actually signed a message or not.
A variant of undeniable signature is the designated con-
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firmer signatures [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 28]. It involves three
parties: the signer, the confirmer and the recipient. If the
signer is unavailable to confirm the signature , the confirmer
can confirm for the recipient. The recipient of the signature
cannot convince anyone else of the validity of the signa-
ture. The construction of designated confirmer signatures
uses zero-knowledge proof [15] in the confirmation proto-
col. In order for the verifier to be convinced of the valid-
ity of the signatures, the confirmer and verifier interact in a
zero-knowledge proof in which the confirmer proves to the
verifier what he got is indeed a valid confirmer signature,
while the verifier is unable to transfer the convince to other
party.
In some situations, an undeniable signature needs to be
transferred to a universally verifiable signature. In [16],
Michels and Stadler extended the undeniable signature to
the convertible undeniable signature supporting designated-
verifier verification, in which the signer can convert given
signatures into universally verifiable signatures. A num-
ber of convertible undeniable signatures were proposed
[16, 17, 18].
The concept of blind signatures was first introduced by
Chaum [19] in 1982. A blind signature scheme allows a
user to get a signature on any message m without reveal-
ing the content of the message to the signer. This blind-
ness property plays a central role in real-world privacy-
preserving protocols, such as electronic cash, electronic
voting and selective disclosure protocols, where privacy is
of great concern [20]. However, the signer has no con-
trol over the attributes except for those bound by the pub-
lic key, and then the signatures may be used in an illegal
way. Therefore, the concept of partially blind signatures
[25] was proposed in 1996 to overcome the above weak-
ness. Partially blind signatures allow the signer to explicitly
include common information in the blind signature under
some agreement with the user.
However, both the blind signatures [19, 21, 22, 23,
24] and the partially blind signatures [25] have the ’self-
authenticating’ property that anyone having a copy of any
signature can check its validity using the corresponding
public information, and signatures can be transferred in any
way by anyone. From the signer’s point of view, that will
jeopardize the privacy of the signer. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to merge the privacy-preserving or selective disclosure
property into the blind signatures as well as the partially
blind signatures.
At IEEE AINA 2005 [26], a convertible undeniable
partially blind signature (CUPBS) scheme was proposed.
The CUPBS extended the concept of partially blind sig-
nature to the convertible undeniable partially blind signa-
ture, in which only the signer can verify given signatures,
and confirm/disavow the validity/invalidity of given signa-
tures to the verifier, and convert given signatures into uni-
versally verifiable signatures. They did not use the notion
of designated verifier proofs in the confirmation protocol
and disavowal protocol. They utilized the interactive zero-
knowledge proof in the confirmation and disavowal proto-
cols. That is, the signer and the verifier need to interact
with each other for proving the validity or invalidity of the
given signature. However, the CUPBS scheme is not se-
cure [26, 27]. In this paper we present a security flaw on
the CUPBS scheme. We show that the signer can disavow
any valid signature. At the same time, we present an im-
provement to fix the security flaw. The improved scheme
can prevent the signer from either proving that a given valid
signature as invalid, or cheating the verifier.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In
the next section we review the CUPBS scheme. In section
3, we analyze the security of the CUPBS scheme. In section
4, we present an improvement on the disavowal protocol of
the signature scheme. In the end, we conclude this paper.
2 CUPBS Scheme
We first review the convertible undeniable partially blind
signature (CUPBS) scheme in [26].
The system parameters are {p; q; g; 〈g〉;H(·);F (·)},
where p and q are large primes that satisfy q|(p − 1), and
g is an element in Z∗p with order q. Let 〈g〉 denote a
subgroup in Z∗p generated by g. We assume that there
exists no algorithm running in expected polynomial time
which decides with non-negligible probability better than
guessing whether two discrete logarithms are equal. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq and F : {0, 1}∗ → 〈g〉 be public secure
hash functions. All arithmetic operations are done in Zp in
the following.
The signer’s private and public key pair is {x, y = gx},
where x is odd.
2.1 Convertible Undeniable Partially
Blind Signature
Sign: To sign a message m, the user (requester) and
the signer first agree on a common information info in a
predetermined way.
(1) The signer chooses k, c, d ∈R Z∗q , computes z =
F (y||info), a = yk, b = gczd, and then sends a, b to the
user.
(2) The user chooses t1, t2, t3, t4 ∈R Z∗q , computes
z = F (y||info), α = at1yt2 , β = bt1gt3zt4 , ε =
H(α‖β‖z‖y‖info‖m), e = (ε−t4)t−11 (mod q), and sends
e to the signer.
(3) The signer computes s = e − d(mod q), r =
k − sx(mod q), and then sends (r, s, c, d) and proves
logg(grys) = logy a to the user using ZKP (See [15] for
the details of ZKP).
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(4) If the sender accepts, computes ρ = rt1 + t2(mod q),
ω = st1(mod q), σ = ct1 + t3(mod q), δ =
dt1 + t4(mod q), and publishes the signature {ρ, ω, σ, δ}
on message m with common information info. Otherwise,
outputs False.
Verification: The signer can verify a given signature
{ρ, ω, σ, δ} by checking whether
z = F (y||info),
ω + δ = H((gρyω)x‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m).
Confirmation or Disavowal: Given an alleged signature
{ρ, ω, σ, δ} on a message m,
Step 1. The signer (the prover) computes A = gρyω and
B = Ax.
Step 2. The signer then sends (A,B) and proves
logA B = logg y to the verifier using ZKP.
Step 3. The verifier checks whether
A = gρyω, (1)
z = F (y||info), (2)
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m). (3)
If they all hold, the verifier accepts the signature as valid;
otherwise, invalid.
Selective conversion: When the signer wants to convert
a given signature σm,info = {ρ, ω, σ, δ} into a universally
verifiable one, he computes
A = gρyω,
B = Ax,
(c′, s′) = SEQDL(g, A, y,B, σm,info),
and publishes the receipt (c′, s′, B).
Universally verification: Anyone can verify the signa-
ture σm,info with the receipt (c′, s′, B) by checking
c′ = H(g||gρyω||y||B||gs′yc′ ||(gρyω)s′Bc′ ||σm,info),
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m).
2.2 Security of the CUPBS Scheme
The CUPBS scheme was claimed that it has the follow-





(5) Zero-knowledge and uncheatable.
3 Security Flaw of the CUPBS Signature
Scheme
In this section, we analyze Huang et al.’s convertible un-
deniable partially blind signature scheme from the security
point of view. A security flaw is found. We show that the
signer can disavow any valid signature to the verifier.
Assume σm,info = {ρ, ω, σ, δ} is a valid undeniable par-
tially blind signature on a message m with a predetermined
agreeable common information info. Then, the signer can
make the verifier accept the signature as invalid through the
following interaction:
Step 1. The signer selects s ∈R Z∗q , computes A = ysρ
and B = Ax, and sends (A,B) to the verifier.
Step 2. The verifier chooses a, b ∈R Z∗q , computes α =
Aagb, and sends α to the signer.
Step 3. The signer chooses t ∈R Z∗q , computes β1 =
αgt and β2 = βx1 , and sends (β1, β2) to the verifier.
Step 4. The verifier sends (a, b) to the signer.
Step 5. If α = Aagb, the signer sends t to the verifier.
Step 6. The verifier checks whether:
β1 = Aagb+t,
β2 = Bayb+t.
If both of them hold, then the verifier accepts that logA B =
logg y. Therefore, she believes that the signer does not cheat
her. Otherwise, the signer is cheating her.
Step 7. The verifier checks whether:
A = gρyω,
z = F (y||info),
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m).
These equations are the checking conditions of the Confir-
mation or Disavowal in Equation (1), (2) and (3) in section
2.
It is easy to see that
A = gρyω,
and
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m).
Therefore, the conditions in Equation (1), (2) and (3) do not
hold. This results in that the verifier will accept that the
signature is invalid.
From the above interaction, we have shown that the
signer can disavow any valid signature to the verifier. That
is, we have shown that Huang et al.’s convertible unde-
niable partially blind signature scheme has no soundness
with respect to the disavowal protocol of the scheme [26].
Soundness means that the signer can not cheat the verifier
with non-negligible probability. Therefore, Huang et al.’s
scheme is not secure.
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4 Improvement of the Disavowal Protocol of
the CUPBS Scheme
In this section, we provide an improvement on Huang
et al.’s convertible undeniable partially blind signature
scheme [26]. This improvement lets the Disavowal proto-
col have the completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge.
Therefore, the signer can not disavow any valid signature.
To do this, we fix the Disavowal protocol as follows:
Disavowal Protocol: Given a signature σm,info =
{ρ, ω, σ, δ} on a message m with a predetermined agree-
able common information info.
Step 1. The verifier computes A = gρyω, and sends A to
the signer.
Step 2. The signer computes B = Ax, and sends B to
the verifier.
Step 3. The verifier chooses a, b ∈R Z∗q , computes h1 =
Aagb, and sends h1 to the signer.
Step 4. The signer chooses s ∈R Z∗q , computes h2 =
h1g
s and h3 = hx2 , and sends (h2, h3) to the verifier.
Step 5. The verifier sends (a, b) to the signer.
Step 6. If h1 = Aagb, the signer sends s to the verifier.
Step 7. The verifier checks whether:
h2 = yaωgb+aρ+s, (4)
h3 = Bayb+s. (5)
IF both of them hold, then the verifier accepts that logA B =
logg y. Therefore, she believes that the signer does not cheat
her in the above proof. Otherwise, the signer is cheating her.
Step 8. The verifier computes z = F (y||info) and
checks whether:
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m). (6)
If Equation (6) holds, then the verifier accepts that the sig-
nature is invalid. Otherwise, the invalidity is undetermined.
Theorem 1: We prove the improved protocol has the
following properties:
(1) Completeness: Given an invalid signature
σm,info = {ρ, ω, σ, δ} on a message m with a prede-
termined agreeable common information info, if the signer
(prover) and the verifier both follow the procedures of the
protocol, then the verifier always accepts the signature as
invalid.
(2) Soundness: Given a valid signature σm,info =
{ρ, ω, σ, δ} on a message m with a predetermined agree-
able common information info, a cheating signer (prover)
cannot convince the verifier to accept the signature as
invalid with non-negligible probability.
(3) Zero-knowledge: Given an invalid signature, if the
signer follows the procedures of the proposed protocol, any
verifier can not achieve any useful information except that
the signature is not a valid signature.
Proof: (1) Completeness: It is easy to check that
h2 = h1gs = (gρyω)agbgs = yaωgb+aρ+s (7)
h3 = hx2 = (h1g
s)x = ((gρyω)agbgs)x = ((gρyω)a)xyb+s = Bayb+s,
(8)
ω + δ = H(B‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m). (9)
(2) Soundness: Given a valid signature σm,info =
{ρ, ω, σ, δ} on message m with common information info,
if the signer can convince the verifier that Equation (6)
holds, then the signer cheats the verifier successfully.
Since the signer has no control on the given valid signa-
ture σm,info = {ρ, ω, σ, δ} on message m with common
information info, what the signer can do is to provide a dif-
ferent B′ such that ω + δ = H(B′‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m).
Therefore, the signer (prover) needs to construct a B′ ∈ 〈g〉
such that
B′ = Ax = (gρyω)x = yρyxω = yρ+xω (10)
ω + δ = H(B′‖gσzδ‖z‖y‖info‖m) (11)
The signer can easily choose such an element B′ ∈ 〈g〉,
which satisfies Equation (10) and (11). However, it is easy
to see that the chosen B′ can not pass the checking of Equa-
tion (4) and (5), since the steps (1)-(7) are ZKP. Therefore,
the signer (prover) cannot cheat the verifier successfully.
(3) Zero-knowledge: This property is derived from the
ZKP used in the protocol.
5 Conclusion
A security flaw on Huang et al.’s convertible undeniable
partially blind signature scheme was reported: the signer
can disavow any valid signature. Thus, the signer can cheat
the verifier. Therefore, the soundness property of undeni-
able signatures does not hold in their scheme. To address
the security flaw, we have presented an improvement, espe-
cially on the underlying disavowal protocol of their scheme.
The improved disavowal protocol has the completeness,
soundness, and zero-knowledge. This can prevent the signer
from cheating the verifier. That is, the improved scheme
will be essentially zero-knowledge and uncheatable.
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